Biohazard assessment of biodefense vaccine candidates forms the basis for a facility-and activityspecific risk assessment performed to determine the biosafety levels and general safety standards required for biological product development. 
Introduction
In general terms, biohazard is the intrinsic property of an infectious agent that determines the nature and severity of adverse effects on the affected population. Biotechnology-derived biodefense medical countermeasure development requires that candidate products under development undergo a systematic biohazard assessment with the goals to define and identify the intrinsic biohazard elements associated vaccine candidates as opposed to the wild-type virulent strains. Essentially, biohazard assessment is qualitative in nature and based on a combination of extensive review and analysis of published literature on the wild-type and their vaccine counterparts. As part of this effort, published data from epidemiological investigations, laboratory investigations on experimental animals, and environmental studies are reviewed to develop a systematic analytical framework based on the macromolecular modifications between wild-type and attenuated vaccine strains, biochemical characteristics for biohazard based on phylogenetic analysis of species and strains of wild-type and attenuated organisms.
Incorporating biohazard assessment as part of the product development process is essential when developing highly sophisticated biodefense-oriented medical countermeasure products for military and civilian uses. A well-conducted biohazard assessment could guide: (a) evaluation of the technical base for selection of candidates for biologics product development; (b) biosafetyrelated decision in the selection of facilities to conduct various production, testing, and evaluation activities; (c) process development and validation; (d) manufacture process and controls-related decisions; (e) pre-clinical animal testing; (f) data incorporation and preparation of the Investigational New Drug (IND) application for filing with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA); (f) biosafety-related decisions in clinical trials; and (g) successful filing of the new biologics licensure application with the FDA. Evidently, biohazard assessment could have a significant impact directly and indirectly across the entire product development spectrum.
This paper outlines a WoE-based biohazard assessment derived from two interrelated analytical approaches to biohazard evaluation for biodefense vaccines. The first approach is based on the macromolecu-lar modification through bioengineering on wild-type strains to yield vaccine candidates. Our studies on the Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis (VEE) vaccine candidates are used as an illustrative example of this approach. The second approach is based on a phylogenetic analysis together with comparative biomarkers associated with toxicity assessment of wild-type and vaccine strains. Our studies on the Francisella tularensis, wildtype, and vaccine strain, Biovar LVS (NDBR, 101), are used as an illustrative example of this approach.
Methods and Results

Biohazard Analysis Principles
The biohazard analysis follows the chemical and biological risk assessment components that include: (a) hazard assessment, which involves an evaluation of the intrinsic hazard characteristics attributable to the phylogenetic, biochemical, or macromolecular properties linked to hazard attributes; (b) dose-response evaluation, which in the case of a biological agent involves parameters such as minimal dose for infectivity, pathogenicity, environmental transmission, and distribution in the ecosystem populations; (c) exposure assessment such as those involved in occupational, clinical, and general environment-related activities using a set of realistic exposure scenarios; and (d) risk characterization, a formalized approach to combine the characteristics of hazard, toxicity, and exposure to derive a measure of risk associated with the biological agent.
2 2.1.1 Biohazard Analysis Based on Macromolecular Modifications: Rao et al. (2006) describes the biohazard assessment approach based on the macromolecular modification through bioengineering of wild-type strains to yield vaccine candidates as in the case of V3526, the Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis (VEE) vaccine strain. Figure 1 illustrates macromolecular construction of V3526 that results in modifying pathogenicity but retaining the immunogenic potentials. Briefly, V3526 is a live-attenuated vaccine candidate constructed by sitedirected mutagenesis of the full-length cDNA V3000 clone with the desired attenuating mutations (Davis et al., 1991; Grieder et al., 1995) . The deletion mutation eliminates the sequence encoding a furin protease cleavage site, which is utilized during maturation of the viral glycoproteins. The deletion results in the inclusion of the E3 glycoprotein in the spikes of the V3526 virion. Figure 2 illustrates site-induced mutation at the furin cleavage site that locks the potential for reversion to a more pathogenic form during successive replications. The combination of these two mutations (deletion and substitution) results in a stable infectious virus with low pathogenicity (Davis et al., 1991) . V3526 safety and reactogenicity have also been studied in a variety of animal models and have consistently shown lower neurovirulence and minimal potential for vector transmission (Hart et al., 2000; Ludwig et al., 2001 (NDBR, 101), are used as an illustrative example for this approach. Phylogenetic analysis of F. tularensis involved mapping of the biochemical, bacteriological, and molecular data at the subspecie and biovar levels to identify biomarkers for pathogenicity and infectivity. The biohazard analysis consists of a systematic comparative analysis of these biomarkers' presence and distribution in the subspecies and biovars for both wild strains and potential vaccine candidates. Figure 3 illustrates the phylogeny of F. tularensis used in the biohazard analysis. Briefly, the genus Francisella has two species-F. tularensis and F. philomiragia. Of the two, F. philomiragia is less virulent, mostly waterborne, and relatively rare in occurrence. There are four subspecies of F. tularensis with a unique ecosystem and global distribution pattern. F. tularensis subspecies neararctica (biovar type A) is the most virulent among the subspecies and found predominantly in mammalian species and arthropod vectors in North America. F. tularensis subsp. holarctica (a.k.a. palaearctica, biovar type B) is moderately pathogenic, mostly waterborne, with multiple biovars distributed in Asia, Europe, and North America. F. tularensis subsp. mediaasiatica was isolated only from central Asia and former Soviet Republics. Finally, the F. tularensis, subsp. novicida was isolated from water samples in Utah (North America). Differences in pathogenicity and virulence among the F. tularensis subspecies and biovars were determined using a combination of taxonomic information, growth characteristics, biochemical analysis, and phylogenomic analysis.
Scientists have adopted more extensive genetic analysis to establish the evolutionary relationships among various subspecies of F. tularensis. Phylogenetic analysis based on unidirectional genomic deletion events and single nucleotide variations in four subspecies of F. tularensis indicated that the highly virulent F. tularensis subsp. tularensis (type A) appeared before the less virulent F. tularensis subsp. holaarctica (type B) (Svensson et al., 2005) . These phylogenetic investigations revealed specific, unidirectional gene loss in the attenuated vaccine strains of F. tularensis compared to the more virulent strains. The use of unidirectional deletions for phylogenetic analysis is based on the assumption that these events stabilize in bacterial populations providing a sort of phylogenetic lineage. For example, Svensson et al. (2005) used microarray studies to identify large size regions of difference among F. tularensis strains. Direct repeat sequences within these regions were compared for various strains of F. tularensis to establish evolutionary relationships among various virulent and vaccine strains. These analyses revealed an evolutionary scenario where the highly virulent F. tularensis, subsps. tularensis (type A) originated before the less virulent F. tularensis, subsps. holarctica (type B). Attenuated strains of F. tularensis exhibited unidirectional gene loss compared to their virulent progenators (Svensson et al., 2005) .
Analysis of the phylogenomic sequence for regions identified as unique and associated with pathogenicity is increasingly used in biohazard analysis. Using the genomic data for the most virulent F. tularensis, strain SHU S4 (biovar A), sequence repeats, generally known as variable-number tandem repeats (VNTR), were identified and compared with other known genomic sequence data for F. tularensis subspecies, biovars, and strains isolated from a variety of biological samples (Farlow et al., 2001 ). These investigations revealed VNTR sequences to be an effective discriminator to rapidly identify and characterize biovars and strains during the epidemiological investigation of an outbreak. These findings also indicated that genomic sequences data could be used to establish phylogenetic relationships and geographic distribution among various biovars and strains to locate a source of infection. These studies reveal clustering of VTNR loci, which were generally less diverse among biovar B isolates compared to those from infective biovar A isolates.
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Figure 2 Lethal Mutation Due to Furin Cleavage Locks V3526 Potentials for Reversibility with Viability.
Weight-of-Evidence Methology
The WoE procedure used in biohazard analysis is based on standard methodologies adopted by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the development of a WoE scheme and designation of hazard codes for the chemical and biological toxicant effects on human health and the environment (CDC, 2000; Rao et al., 2004; U.S. EPA, 2000) .
For instance, the WoE-based hazard assessment for biological agent virulent species/sub-types and vaccine candidates identified four categories of hazard criteria as the basis for a WoE-based ranking and prioritization for a potential public health and environmental hazard: (1) pre-clinical data on both the virulent species/subtypes and the vaccine strains; (2) clinical data derived mostly from epidemiological studies on the incidence and extent of morbidity and/or mortality from epizootic events and clinical reports; (3) environmental transport and fate data related to transmission and dissemination of the biological agents and vaccine candidates; and (4) other considerations relating to data on genetic homology of virulent strains and vaccine candidates, and data on the potential for reversion of vaccine strains. 2 2.2.1 WoE Criteria and Category Designations: Based on these WoE criteria biohazard designations, a data schema was developed on the basis of the preponderance of evidence and a prioritized ranking of the available data with a particular emphasis on the availability of mechanistic data for virulence and pathogenicity (veterinary and human data). Attempts have been made to develop a WoE-based designation and ranking for biohazard following guidelines set up by the CDC and World Health Organization (WHO) biological agent risk categories for public health preparedness (WHO, 2001 ). The risk-based designations for the agents are as follows: (a) Risk Group 1: Agents not associated with disease in healthy adult humans. (b) Risk Group 2: Agents associated with human disease that is rarely serious, and for which preventive or therapeutic interventions are often available. (c) Risk Group 3: Agents associated with serious or lethal human disease for which preventive or therapeutic interventions may be available-high individual risk but low community risk. (d) Risk Group 4: Agents that are likely to cause serious or lethal human disease for which preventive or therapeutic interventions are not usually available-high individual and high community risk.
An example of one such WoE-based biohazard category would involve (Rao et al., 2004) : (a) Category A designation is used when evidence indicating greatest potential for broad-based adverse impact on human and animal health and the general environment with limited or no availability of medical intervention. (b) Category B designation is used when evidence indicating potential, under the right conditions, for environmental dissemination resulting in illness, but of a lower order and 
Results and Discussion
The intrinsic infectivity for VEE virus in experimental animals can be measured as an infectious dose (dose required to initiate infection) or a median lethal dose (LD50). In humans, the infectious dose has been estimated following experimental subcutaneous inoculation and accidental aerosol exposure among laboratory workers. Infectious dose is one of the early indicators for hazard for microbial agents and contributes to the establishment of safe-handling and transportation procedures for infectious agents.
According to the published Material Safety Data Sheet for VEE virus, infectious dose is between 5 to 10 organisms by respiratory route and 10 6 to 10 8 organisms by ingestion (Health Canada, 2001) . Infectious doses for the IA/B wild-type Trinidad strain range from 1 pfu up to 100 pfu depending on the animal species and route of exposure. In mice and hamsters the infectious dose can be as low as 1 pfu following parenteral inoculation. An infectious dose of Trinidad and TC-83 for humans by aerosol exposure is estimated to be between 10 to 100 pfu (Smith et al., 2000) . In addition to having a relatively low infectious dose in several animal systems, VEE is also a highly infectious virus, with 90%-100% of humans who are exposed to an infectious dose, regardless of the route of exposure, exhibiting clinical signs of illness.
Many animal safety, reactogenicity, and immunogenicity studies have compared the effects of V3526 with another vaccine strain, TC-83 (Hart et al., 2000; Ludwig et al., 2001; Turell et al., 1999) . These studies have shown several differences in the safety profiles. In general, V3526 was found to elicit an immune response at least as robust as TC-83, without the attendant pathology observed with TC-83. Wild-type VEE virus is extremely lethal in several different strains of mice, including BALB/c and C3H/HeN. This susceptibility makes them an ideal animal system to test the pathogenicity, safety profile, and immunogenicity of VEE vaccine candidates.
In a recent comparative study evaluating the neurovirulence of vaccine strains, juvenile rhesus macaques were inoculated with V3526 and TC-83 intrathalamic/intraspinal (i.t./i.s.) or subcutaneous (s.c.), followed by extensive clinical and biochemical assessment over a 180-day period. The results indicated a transient clinical profile for V3526 demonstrating immunogenic properties but without a demonstrable neurovirulence in the clinically relevant subcutaneous route of administration (Fine et al., 2008) . Ludwig et al. (2001) investigated the pathogenic potentials of V3526 and TC-83 on BALB/c and C3H/HeN mice following intracranial (i.c.) inoculation. Interestingly, BALB/c mice receiving V3526 via the i.c. route did not manifest signs of infection, but mice that received TC-83 i.c. consistently exhibited signs of disease, including inactivity and ruffled hair coats (Table 1) . Even more pronounced differences in pathogenicity between TC-83 and V3526 viruses were observed following i.c. inoculation of C3H/HeN mice, a strain of mouse that is more susceptible to wild-type VEE infection than are BALB/c mice. The i.c. dose needed to kill 50% of C3H/HeN mice (LD50) for TC-83 was calculated to be ~20 pfu (Table 1) . In contrast, all C3H/HeN mice receiving an i.c. dose of V3526 survived. In addition, no clinical symptoms were observed following i.c. administration of 10 6 pfu of V3526 into C3H/HeN.
Based on Hart et al. (2000) . Adapted from Rao et al. (2006 Table 1 Pathogenicity of V3526 in Mice A key biohazard determination would involve an assessment of environmental transmission and dissemination of a biological agent. Table 2 summarizes a comparative assessment of mosquito infection and environmental dissemination of V3526 and TC-83. Whereas no significant differences in infection rate or dissemination rate were observed when the concentration of virus in the blood meal was equal to 10 6 pfu/ml, a significantly higher rate of infection was observed in the V3526 group fed on blood meal containing 10 7 pfu/ml or 10 8 pfu/ml of the virus. For example, as a vector of natural transmission life cycle of VEE, mosquitoes play a crucial role in the environmental distribution between animals and humans. A key criterion for biohazard is the determination of the ability of VEE-infected mosquitoes to transmit the virus by bite and mosquitoes to become infected by feeding on infected animals. Turell et al. (1999) investigated VEE's potential for environmental transmission by inoculating three groups of mosquitoes with TC-83, V3000, or V3526. Maximum titer achieved by the virus in each group was determined (Table 3 ). The group inoculated with V3526 achieved the lowest titers suggesting that the probability of transmission of the virus by the mosquito to a susceptible host during feeding is less than that associated with V3000 or TC83. This was confirmed by additional repeated testing and analyses.
In a related study, V3526 and TC-83 passaged five times sequentially in mice (i.c. inoculation) indicated that none of the V3526-inoculated animals exhibited clinical symptoms at any passage (Table 4) . However, on the fifth passage, one of the mice inoculated with TC-83 exhibited VEE-like symptoms and died, suggesting that TC-83 had possibly reverted to a more virulent phenotype. No evidence of reversion was observed in hamsters that were infected with V3526 by intra-thoracic inoculated mosquitoes (data not included). Collectively, these studies demonstrated adequate evidence that the likelihood of V3526 reverting to a virulent phenotype is considerably low.
The WoE procedures used here are based on standard methodologies adopted by the CDC (CDC, 2000) and U.S. EPA (U.S. EPA, 2000) in the development of WoE schemes and designation of hazard codes for chemical and biological toxicant effect on human health and the general environment (Tables 5 and 6) . Table 5 is a summary of the WoE based on clinical and pre-clinical morbidity and mortality assessment criteria for VEE wild-type, TC-83, and V3526. Similarly, Table 6 is a summary of the WoE based on two key environmental criteria: dissemination and transmissibility. Table 7 is a WoE summary for generally categorized as "other considerations" that takes into account data on genetic homology of the VEE virus and vaccine candi- reported from published literature for various subspecies and biochemical analyses. Use of molecular evidence, such as 16S mRNA to classify F. tularensis, was considered more reliable to a classification schema on the basis of biochemical analysis (Sandstrom et al., 1992) . More recent investigations have indicated genetic markers such as variable-number tandem repeats (VNTR) and single nucleotide variations (SNV) as better discriminators of the subspecies and strains identification (Farlow et al., 2001; Svensson et al., 2005) . The WoE criteria listed in Figure 4 represents a combination of both traditional biochemical and molecular makers consistently reported in the literature as key to discriminate the F. tularensis species, subspecies, and strains. This forms the basis for the WoE-based biohazard assessment shown for various species and subspecies including the vaccine strains (Figure 4) . This paper described a WoE-based framework for the biohazard analysis and demonstrated an example of such an approach to two vaccine candidates, VEE virus strain 3526 and F. tularensis LVS, a viral and bacterial agent, respectively. As part of the biohazard assessment, the author performed a thorough review of published literature on medical pathology, epidemiology, pre-clinical investigational studies, and environmental data on the etiologic agent subtypes and the vaccine candidates. Using standard analytical procedures, the data were then analyzed relative to two intrinsic hazard parameters-health hazard and environmental hazard. Using a WoE approach, the potential hazards of etiologic agent wild-subtypes and vaccine candidates were ranked under three main categories: Public Health Hazard, Environmental Hazard, and Overall Hazard. A WoE scoring system allows for both a determination of the intrinsic hazard of each vaccine and also allows for a comparison of values between vaccines. The information in this hazard assessment, and the WoE scores in particular, provided a systematic analytical framework to begin facility-specific risk assessments for follow-up on manufacturing and Phase 1 clinical trials.
Conclusions
In conclusion, we attempted to define and develop systematic approaches to performing biohazard assessments of hazardous biologics product candidates with potentials for adverse health and environmental impacts. Our attempts to adopt an existing framework for health and environmental risk assessment indicate that a WoE scheme offers a consistent framework to compare wild-type strains with vaccine candidates. Using two distinct but interrelated analytical approaches involving a recombinant candidate vaccine (Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis virus) and a phylogenetics-driven biomarker analysis (Francisella tularensis), the author demonstrated the value of the WoE scheme for comparative biohazard assessment of biodefense medical countermeasure products.
Biohazard analysis is the key step in the determination of: (a) facility selection for process development and validation; (b) the biosafety and biosecurity containment levels; (c) compliance requirements under existing environmental and occupational safety regulations; and (d) submission requirements to regulatory agencies to obtain a license for commercial development.
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Introduction
Risk assessment is a prerequisite for the commercialization of any genetically modified (GM) crop, as regulatory bodies require information regarding the potential risk of releasing them into the environment (Dutton et al., 2003) . With the increasing trend to produce GM crops commercially, concerns over the safety of these crops and crop products have increased very relevantly as demonstrated by several Multilateral Environmental Agreements, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Cartagena Protocol of Biosafety (Young, 2004) . The main biosafety concerns at the present time include the safety of human health, non-target organisms, and the environment, as well as the risk of horizontal gene flow (Snow et al., 2005) . Therefore, any gene or gene product with potential beneficiary impact must be assessed for its risks before using it to produce any GM crop.
A large portion of research is going on to develop GM crops with resistance to biotic stresses like insects, weeds, viruses, and fungi. Among the pathogens, fungi have been identified as the most notorious group since they cause 70% of the major crop diseases (Agrios, 1997) . At present, applying fungicides is the most widely practiced method to reduce crop losses from fungal attack. However, due to an absence of natural resistance, an intensive search is going on to develop a safer and more effective fungus-control method. Consumers' concern over a possible environmental impact associated with exposure to fungicides also acts as a driving factor.
